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Abstract 
Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique 
from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector 
dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. 
But a secret $2.2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian 
banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large 
profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor's capitalist road. The IMF 
cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.  
Keywords: Mozambique; Ematum; secret loan; donor; IMF; corruption; 
neoliberal; tuna 
Introduction 
When Mozambique's $2.2 bn of imports of weapons and fishing boats, funded by secret 
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loans, became public in 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut off its lending 
and a group of 14 donors halted budget support.1 This response could be seen as unfair 
or disingenuous because, as I argue in this article, the $2.2 bn deal was the direct result 
of conditions carefully created by the same lenders and donors during four decades. 
They wanted to convert the Mozambican leadership from a socialist to a capitalist 
orientation during the Cold War, and then move to incorporate Mozambique in a 
particular form of globalisation usually known as neoliberalism.  
In parallel with the rise of neoliberalism was the increasing use of managerial 
concepts, one of which was 'change management',2 which puts an emphasis on how 
people within an organisation can be can be made to support and even promote changes 
desired by the management. We argue here that the past four decades has seen a loose 
form of change management as the Mozambican elite was been moved first from 
socialists to capitalists, and then to support globalization and act in the interests of 
foreign lenders, donors, and corporations. In effect, parts of the socialist elite were 
converted into a 'comprador' group. The term 'comprador' is Portuguese and means 
'buyer' and dates from the 17th century when it was used for local staff buying for 
Portuguese traders in Asia, and has come to mean local people acting in the interests of 
foreign enterprises and agencies.  
Overcoming resistance to change is a central part of change management and its 
extensive literature. A 2002 study of change within the US State Department noted that 
'major organizational changes or innovations can anticipate resistance, especially if 
proposed changes alter values and visions related to the existing order.' The study 
pointed to 'self interest' as the number one reason for resistance to change, but also cited 
'political factors'.3 Thus the goal of change managers is to convince most people that the 
change is in their interests.  
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For Mozambique, a goal of lenders and donors has been to convince a 
significant portion of the elite that the move to neoliberalism and comprador capitalism 
was to their benefit, and also would help Mozambique. This used a mix of carrots and 
sticks. At the level of the national government, aid and lending has been reduced or 
increased in response to changes in government policy that were deemed to be good or 
bad. However, individuals rather than institutions have been a key target, especially in 
the post-war 1990s when the IMF depressed salaries. Donor and UN agencies offered 
the best jobs and highest salaries; for those who stayed in government and were 
cooperative, there were salary top-ups, per diems, cars, consultancy contracts, foreign 
trips, or sometimes even hiring their relatives in aid agencies or on projects. The 
'partners' of the donors and lenders who received these rewards were those who 
supported the changes, and acted in the interests of lenders and donors. Thus they 
became a comprador group. 
Change management attempts to be persuasive, winning over the largest 
possible group of people, while marginalising or dismissing the rest, and this happened 
in Mozambique. The reluctant or recalcitrant holdouts were labelled as a communist old 
guard who could not change. Many simply never received the perks that went to the 
new comprador group. And in the 1990s the World Bank forced the dismissal of a 
Mozambican deputy minister and some senior officials who did not support Bank 
policies. 
'Lenders and donors' are a loose collection of more than 30 agencies in 
Mozambique who have largely acted together. The two most important lenders are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, whose lending is conditional on 
having policy agreements, which tend to impose neoliberal policies. These agencies 
were immensely powerful in the 1990s. Individual countries and the European Union 
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(EU) are aid donors (and sometimes also smaller lenders). Donors sometimes act 
individually and sometimes together, particularly the group of donors to the central 
government budget (known as the budget support donors) and smaller groups of donors 
to individual ministry budgets or projects. The budget support donors have a formal 
agreement with the government, have access to internal ministry policy discussions, and 
have several times collectively agreed to withhold budget support, as they did in 2016.  
The power of the IMF and World Bank is indirect. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
nearly all donors made their aid conditional on having IMF and World Bank 
programmes, which made the donors enforcers of neoliberal policies. Two decades 
later, in 2016, the budget support donors agreed that the IMF would take the lead in 
negotiating with the government over the $2.2 bn secret loans.4 
Sometimes this coalition of lenders and donors can be very loose, with 
disagreements between the World Bank and IMF and between donors. Some European 
donor agencies, publicly or at least privately, did not initially support structural 
adjustment and neoliberalism, but with the election of more conservative governments 
in Europe, nearly all supported such policies in the early 2000s. Despite these 
disagreements, lenders and donors have largely acted as a group to impose the policies 
to shift Mozambique from socialism to neoliberal capitalism. 
Lenders and donors and their staff are not acting in bad faith. Most believe they 
are promoting policies which are the best for Mozambique and that by choosing those 
who agree with them as 'partners' they are acting in the country's long term interests to 
reduce poverty and make Mozambique part of globalization. But the effects, intended 
and unintended, have often been devastating. In 2004 I wrote an article here (3WQ) 'Do 
donors promote corruption?: the case of Mozambique'.5 In this paper, I argue that 
lenders and donors have continued with policies and decisions that benefit the 
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compradors and those who want to join the global elite, while working against those 
who want an honest domestic development. Of course, no one stands up and publicly 
states 'we are going to create corruption and buy the elite', nor are there secret meetings 
in closed rooms to plot a conspiracy to corrupt Mozambique - although there have been 
closed donor meetings in which it was agreed not to oppose corruption because there 
were higher priorities. Over four decades the policies enforced and individual decisions 
taken mean that donor and lender impositions have sharply increased corruption and 
promoted a culture of secrecy. 
It is individual Mozambicans who make the deals with foreign companies and 
benefit from corruption, and they act from a mixture of greed and a genuine belief that 
in a neoliberal world they are benefitting their country. Many Mozambicans have fought 
to oppose this trend and to promote integrity and domestic production, but the change 
management process means that most have been marginalised. In this paper, I map the 
twisting road laid out by the donors and lenders, and show how the promoters of the 
arms and boats deal could have thought they were following this road. 
 
A role in the Cold War 
Mozambique may seem a small and marginal African country, but it became important  
in the struggle between 'capitalism' and 'communism', and thus attracted 
disproportionate diplomatic, intelligence, donor and lender attention. The story goes 
back 70 years. A 1942 policy that "the Government of the United States of America 
undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies"6 was 
confirmed to gain Portugal's 1949 agreement to join Nato and to allow the Azores in the 
mid-Atlantic to be used as a stopping and refuelling place during the 1948-9 airlift to 
Berlin, a key event in the early Cold War. Thus the US agreed not to push for 
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decolonization of Portugal's African colonies, which included Mozambique. White rule 
continued in Mozambique and Angola, as well as Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and 
Namibia; by the early 1960s, the liberation movements in all five countries were 
receiving support from the then communist countries, as well as clandestine support 
from the Nordic states.  
Mozambique came to independence in 1975 under Frelimo (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique) and President Samora Machel. It was nominally socialist, 
but its image of socialism was Swedish social democracy. Health, education and rented 
property were nationalised, but Frelimo tried not to interfere in economic sectors and 
few companies were nationalized. Old colonial companies such as João Ferreira dos 
Santos and Entreposto continued to operate, and still do. Machel even promoted a new 
factory by the US company General Tire. 
But most Portuguese left at independence, frightened by colonial government 
and Catholic Church propaganda that the 'communists' would nationalize everything. 
Many large and small businesses were abandoned by departing settlers. Frelimo also 
inherited state-owned ports and railways, airlines, water companies and banks - but 
without managers and middle level staff who returned to Portugal. The new government 
found itself running hundreds of small, medium and large businesses. The Portuguese 
had educated few Mozambicans, but they suddenly had to run a country. The first five 
years were a struggle; the economy dropped and then recovered. Frelimo tried to steer a 
middle line, with major industry dominated by the state but with an important private 
sector. In 1979, long before privatization was pushed by the IMF, Samora Machel said  
'the state does not sell needles' and handed state-run shops and small businesses to local 
private businesspeople.7  
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Meanwhile, the 1975-80 period provided some space for the new country. 
Internationally, the concept of the developmental state was fashionable, and there was 
even talk of a 'new international economic order'.8 After its defeat in Vietnam, and with 
Jimmy Carter in the White House (1977-80), the United States was not as aggressive. In 
particular Carter's human rights policies had provided a partial check on the apartheid 
government in South Africa. Mozambique backed the socialist liberation movements 
fighting in Zimbabwe and South Africa (where they won, leading to majority rule in 
1980 and 1994). By 1980 Mozambique was a calm, growing, non-corrupt, multi-racial 
country - which was seen as threat by South Africa where apartheid was predicated on 
the belief that the black majority could not run the country. 
When Ronald Reagan took office as president in January 1981, he escalated the 
Cold War and this had a dramatic impact in southern Africa. Under a policy of 
'constructive engagement' white South Africa was seen as the bulwark against 
'communist' governments in the north - Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola. 
A Cold War proxy war was launched in Mozambique (one was already under way in 
Angola) where a new opposition force was created, eventually called Renamo 
(Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). The end of the Cold War and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 brought dramatic change in southern Africa. In Mozambique, 
Malawi, Angola, Namibia and South Africa, parties backed by the United States lost 
elections. Mozambique's war ended with a peace accord in 1992, but the price of the 
US's proxy war was very high: one million Mozambicans died in the 1981-92 war (8% 
of the population) and damage exceeded $20 billion.9 
 
Ongoing market fundamentalism 
In parallel with the intensified Cold War, the US and Britain launched a new economic 
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push to promote globalization through corporations and tightened northern control of 
the world economy through the World Bank and IMF. Their policy came to be known 
as 'neoliberalism' or 'market fundamentalism', described by Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz as a belief  'that if only the government would ensure that 
inflation was low and stable, markets would ensure growth and prosperity for all.'10 The 
initial package of policies forced onto developing countries was named and promoted 
by economist John Williamson as the 'Washington Consensus' and involved 'policy 
reforms that reduced the role of government, such as privatization and the liberalization 
of trade,' as well as promotion of foreign investment.11 But he goes on to argue that in 
the name of the 'Washington Consensus', much more extreme policies were pushed by 
the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury, which were intended to weaken the state, and 
'were inimical to the cause of poverty reduction.' This included 'rapid privatization' and 
demands to 'slash government expenditure'. No government intervention in the 
economy was allowed. The idea was to ensure the private sector had the dominant role 
in the economy, and the professed belief was that the magic of the free market would 
end poverty. Countries were to implement the Washington Consensus reforms as part of 
what the IMF and Bank called 'structural adjustment'. 
The importance of this to western governments was shown in two ways. When 
the war was intensifying, in exchange for promoting talks with South Africa in 1984, 
the US required Mozambique to join the World Bank and IMF. The lenders, backed by 
donors, then put heavy pressure on Mozambique to become the first country at war to 
introduce structural adjustment and cut spending, which it began to do in 1987.  This 
was rewarded by substantial increases in aid. 
Stiglitz noted in 2016 that 'while in most of the world market fundamentalism 
has been discredited,' in some places 'these beliefs continue to flourish'.12 Most 
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important, the IMF continues to follow these lines in Mozambique.  IMF Managing 
Director Christine Lagarde said in 2014: 'Structural adjustments? That was before my 
time. I have no idea what it is. We don’t do that any more.'13 However a study of policy 
conditionality of all IMF loan agreements from 1985 to 2014 found 'little evidence of a 
fundamental transformation of IMF conditionality.' It concluded that 'despite consistent 
rhetoric to the contrary, the IMF still advocates reforms that aim at labour market 
liberalization, public sector employment reduction, or reductions in government wage 
spending.' 14 
This is definitely the case in Mozambique in 2016. The IMF was still calling for 
cuts to the civil service wage bill15, which means the wages of nurses and teachers who 
are the biggest group of civil servants. And the World Bank16 and IMF were still 
pushing for further privatisation of state companies and services, which had been at the 
top of the IMF's list 30 years earlier. President Samora Machel told journalists in 1986: 
'Privatization of the railways and ports, of the schools, of the hospitals. That's what the 
IMF is saying in the negotiations. They've attacked our revolutionary gains and our 
life.'17 There was huge pressure to rapidly privatise, and especially to privatise large 
enterprises such as sugar estates and beer factories to foreign companies. In the 10 years 
1989-98 over 800 of 1,250 public enterprises, including 70 large companies, were 
privatised.18 
But for smaller businesses, there was an unexpected convergence of interests on 
a non-transparent privatisation to officials and to friends and family of the elite. Donors 
supported this because key people would be benefitting from the transition to 
capitalism. On the government side, the war was causing increasing corruption and 
some in the leadership were opposed to negotiations to end the war; privatisations were 
a way to side-line corrupt generals and hardliners who could be retired and given their 
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own businesses. Loans which were never expected to be repaid were provided to the 
owners of the newly privatised businesses by the World Bank and donors. The World 
Bank admitted that 90% of loans given in its 1988 Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Project would not be repaid. The Bank's own evaluation said that 'the 
Bank is alleged to have put substantial pressure on the management of the banks to 
ensure expedient disbursements of project funds; this undermined even further the credit 
quality of the subloans.'19 In effect, the World Bank put pressure on honest Mozambican 
bankers to give loans they knew would not be repaid. The World Bank was supporting 
non-transparent privatizations to senior politicians as late as 1999.20 
A fundamental problem for the victors in the Cold War was that Mozambique 
was a capitalist country without capitalists. Mozambique came to independence with a 
weak business class because Portuguese managers left at independence and indigenous 
Mozambicans had been severely restricted from conducting business by the colonial 
authorities. In the first decade of independence many Mozambicans found themselves 
running abandoned shops and larger businesses and learning by doing. Some were 
successful and in the 1990s some of the privatised and still state-owned business proved 
to be successful and well run.21 
Despite some successes, the biggest problem was a severe shortage of business 
skills and experience - the very basic abilities to keep accounts, calculate profit and loss, 
write even a simple business plan, and think in terms of customers. And none of the 
donors and myriad consultants offered that kind of training, nor did they stress that 
running a business is hard work. And the war left businesses decapitalized, but with 
market fundamentalism, this weak business sector was on its own and never really 
recovered. 
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In my 2004 article I noted that this was important because these newly emergent 
businesspeople had little experience of the world of capitalism and were, in effect, being 
given a crash course by the donors and lenders.22 And the lesson was that capitalism is 
not about profit and production, but about patronage - businesses were privatised and 
given 'loans' that need not be repaid based on who you know and donor whim. And for 
the new businesses, government and donors were major customers and contracts with 
both were based on patronage, and often kickbacks.  
Internationally, two phrases characterised economic thinking in the 1980s: one 
was the 'trickle down theory' that if money was given to the rich they would spend it 
and benefits would 'trickle down' to the poorer, and the other was 'Greed is Good,' given 
prominence in the 1987 film Wall Street. These may seem as caricatures now, but the 
IMF actually used the phrase 'trickle down' in a Mozambique policy document as late as 
2006,23 and the IMF and donors in the 1980s and 90s encouraged the Frelimo elite to 
believe that by getting rich they were helping to reduce poverty. Perhaps the most 
important convert was Armando Guebuza, a liberation war veteran who after 
independence became political commissar of the army and was a strong and 
knowledgeable proponent of Marxism-Leninism. He may have learned about capitalism 
from Marx, but by the time he was elected President in 2004 he was one of 
Mozambique's richest men. 
 
Banks and murder 
In the early 1990s banking was liberalised and the government was pressed to privatise 
the two state-owned commercial banks, Banco Comercial de Moçambique (BCM, 
Commercial Bank of Mozambique) and Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD, 
People's Development Bank). The highly respected Bank of Mozambique governor 
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Adriano Maleiane was already moving to privatise them, but both had accounting and 
corruption problems and Maleiane knew that he had to clean this up first before any 
reputable bank would take them. But the World Bank and IMF would not wait. 
The World Bank in its 7 November 1995 Country Assistance Strategy24 set 
seven 'necessary conditions', something apparently not used elsewhere; if any condition 
was not met, the World Bank would end its programme, which would cut all aid to 
Mozambique because all donors at that time made a World Bank programme a 
condition of aid. One of the conditions required the privatization of BCM. A joint IMF-
World Bank Policy Framework Paper on 11 April 1996 required the privatization of 
both banks that year. Maleiane said the no honest people would take the banks in their 
present shape and the reply was that a corrupt privatization was better than their 
remaining in state hands. In 1996 the only bidder for BCM was a Portuguese 
businessman in Mozambique with a dubious track record and who was diverting money 
lent to him by donors to buy the bank; the World Bank forced the sale to him. BPD 
proved even harder to privatize, but in early 1997 the IMF said that aid to Mozambique 
would be cut off if BPD was not privatised by the end of June. So 1997 BPD was sold 
to a consortium of the Southern Bank Berhad (SBB) of Malaysia (30%) and Invester 
(30%), a Mozambican company headed by Octavio Muthemba, former Industry 
Minister and chair of SPI - Gestão e Investimentos, the Frelimo party holding company, 
with the state keeping 40%. Through a mix of direct theft and bad loans to themselves 
and others in the Frelimo elite, the bank was drained of at least $150 million and then 
handed back to the state in 2001. BCM also collapsed in 2000, and total banking sector 
losses and thefts exceeded $400 mn.25 
Another attempt was made to clean up both banks and privatise them again. But 
journalist Carlos Cardoso investigated the BCM scandal and was gunned down and 
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killed on 22 November 2000. Bank of Mozambique appointed its head of banking 
supervision António Siba-Siba Macuácua as acting heard of BPD (by then called Banco 
Austral). About to expose details of fraud and corrupt lending, including to the Frelimo 
elite, on 11 August 2001 Siba-Siba was murdered and thrown down the stairwell of the 
bank’s headquarters.26 
The annual donor Consultative Group meeting in Maputo was in October, just 
two months after the Siba-Siba murder, and one might have expected the banking 
scandal and murders to have worried the donors. Instead, while Mozambique asked 
donors for $600 million, the donors said this was not enough and gave $722 mn - the 
extra money was enough to plug the hole in the banking system. Former security 
minister Sergio Vieira wrote triumphantly that the donors recognized 'the good 
performance of the government' and that this 'overrides the bank scandal and the 
assassinations of Siba-Siba Macuacua and Carlos Cardoso.' 27 Indeed, at the time 
Norway, Britain and the World Bank all had public policies of not tackling past 
corruption.28 
A few discontented donors forced a forensic audit of Banco Austral and for 
nearly a decade, each year they raised issues of the bank collapse and murder in 
negotiations with the government. But it was really only token, and there was no donor 
protest in 2009 and 2010 when the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PGR) announced that no 
Mozambicans would be prosecuted for plundering and bankrupting Banco Austral or for 
the 2001 assassination. Not prosecuted were the chair and three other board members 
who received large loans for themselves and their companies, knowing this was in 
violation of the law. A senior Frelimo figure was identified as the likely killer of Siba-
Siba, so the investigation was stopped and he was allowed to simply leave Maputo.29  
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Foreign preference 
Tobacco shows the way in which free market and good governance rhetoric was applied 
differently to foreign and domestic companies. Despite claims to wanting to promote 
competition and the free market, it was agreed that international tobacco companies 
could have exclusive buying rights for an entire district, and peasant producers would 
have to sell to that company. On 6 August 2010, Universal Corporation (trading as 
Mozambique Leaf Tobacco, MLT) pleaded guilty to charges brought by the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and paid fines and penalties of $9 
million. Universal admitted that between October 2005 and July 2006 MLT paid cash to 
“a governor” and ”gave gifts including supplies for a bathroom renovation, personal 
travel on a company jet, and cash payments to officials in Mozambique.” Bribes totalled 
$165,000 and were related to the transfer of the exclusive license to buy tobacco in 
Chifunde district, Tete – one of the best districts for tobacco – from another company, 
Dimon, to MLT.30 Despite the guilty plea, no lender or donor pushed for the governor to 
be prosecuted in Mozambique, or for MLT to lose its exclusive rights to the district 
(even though there had been a local peasant protest in Chifunde about the transfer). 
As tobacco shows, although Mozambican producers cannot be protected against 
competition, foreign investors can be, as shown in two other cases. Mozambique's sugar 
estates were badly damaged in the war and needed substantial investment to be 
rehabilitated; international sugar companies agreed to take over the estates, but only if 
they were protected. The IMF agreed, and imported sugar must still be sold at a higher 
price than claimed local production costs. Coca Cola, owned by the South African 
Bottling Company (Sabco), was given similar protection at the same time.31 
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Forcing corruption and foreign dependence 
Corruption and distrust seem endemic in Mozambique today. The Afrobarometer survey 
of 2,400 adult Mozambicans carried out in 2012 found that of those who needed a 
document or permit, a school place, or health care in the year before the survey, roughly 
one quarter had to pay a bribe.32 A survey by Transparency International in 2011 found 
that Mozambique was the most corrupt country in southern Africa, with 68% of people 
who had come into contact with at least one of nine services having to pay a bribe in the 
past year.33 Of those who had contact with the police, 48% paid a bribe. For health, and 
education, 39% and 35% paid. 
For younger Mozambicans, it is the norm, but older people remember a time 
when it was not so. I arrived in Mozambique in 1979, when bribery really was unheard 
of. Two events in 1980 underline this. First was the death of Francisco Langa in May 
1980. A military leader in the liberation war, he became head of support to refugees 
from Zimbabwe. An unprecedented Central Committee statement said he had been 
caught embezzling funds, and shot and killed himself because he was overcome with 
shame. Second was the currency change. Frelimo continued using colonial banknotes 
until 1980, then on the night of 15 June 1980 President Machel went on the radio to 
announce that the currency would be swapped, 1 for 1, for a new Metical. There had 
been months of preparation, but the story never leaked. In schools and offices, one 
person collected the old banknotes of all the staff and took them to a bank to be changed 
and then handed out the new currency. There were no reports of losses or thefts. In 
1980, five years after independence, there was total trust in the bureaucracy and in 
Frelimo - no bribes or commissions, and everyone working together to build a new 
nation. Even in 1985, at the height of the war, a surprised US evaluation of 
Mozambique government-controlled food aid said 'there has been virtually no evidence, 
nor even suggestion, of corruption at the lowest levels.'34 
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Of course war is hugely corrupting; shortages trigger the growth of a parallel 
market and profiteering. Indeed, as we noted earlier, the army itself had become corrupt 
by the late 1980s. Something else happened at the end of the war which changed 
people's attitudes fundamentally. In 1990 with the end of the war in sight, the IMF 
began to impose a particularly harsh form of strucutral adjustment. Aid was capped and 
post-war reconstruction blocked because it was claimed it would be inflationary. Most 
important was a severe wage squeeze. In 1991 the civil service wage range was $31 to 
$500 per month, which the World Bank said was 'very low' and should be raised. 
Instead the IMF forced a massive cut, and in five years the range was $20-$150 per 
month. Nurses and teachers fell below the poverty line in early 1992, below the abject 
poverty line in mid-1993, and below $40 per month in early 1996.35 The outcome was 
unprecedented corruption and dependence on foreigners. 
For nurses and teachers, and other civil servants, there were only two choices for 
feeding the family - take time off work to cultivate a garden and grow food, or ask for 
informal fees. A primary teacher commented: 'we in education have one foot inside and 
the other out, because we are parents and we don't want to see our children dying of 
hunger.'  
Toward the end of the war there was a huge influx of non-government 
organization (NGOs) and a large increase in donor and lender staff. They paid relatively 
high salaries and hired key Mozambican technicians and civil servants; government 
department directors became embassy secretaries or junior project officers in order to 
earn a good salary. Some donors realised that they were decapaciting the government 
and losing the people in government they needed to make their projects function, so 
they began a system of topping up the salaries of those government officials who 
worked with them. This took two forms - direct, official added salary payments, and 
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payments for attending donor-run seminars during the working day or for doing 
consultancies. Of course this extra money was only available to those Mozambicans 
who accepted the new neoliberal economic model. And it created a pattern that better 
salaries and advancement only came though links to foreign agencies.  
Divisions began to appear between the IMF and some donors, who in 1995 
forced the Fund to allow some increase in the minimum wage. But the Fund still kept a 
tight cap on the total government wage bill.36 In 2006 donors complained that this did 
not take into account their desire to increase aid, and made it impossible to hire enough 
teachers and health workers to meet the Millennium Development Goals.37 The result 
was that donors increasingly hired health workers as part of projects or paid 'top-ups' to 
government staff working partly on projects. This was all ‘off-budget’, and all these 
people knew that all or part of their income was at the discretion - indeed whim - of 
donors. 
Was it intentional, or simply useful? Did IMF staff really believe that creating 
corruption and hunger was a necessary price to curb inflation, even when it was seen 
not to work? Did donors and lenders genuinely feel they were helping Mozambique by 
hiring the best staff and by taking key civil servants away from their desks to attend 
endless seminars? Many well-intentioned aid workers probably did. But creating a 
comprador group was a major social change which they also found very useful. 
By the late 1990s, popular discontent with corruption at all levels was growing. 
It was not just teachers and nurses, but also the Frelimo elite at both local and national 
levels, who were accused of using their positions for personal gain. The family of 
President Joaquim Chissano was increasingly implicated. In the 1999 election Chissano 
was re-elected president but the election was close with his margin only 200,000 votes. 
A Frelimo investigation found that many had not voted for Chissano because he was 
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blamed for the corruption. Frelimo was shocked. The constitution allowed Chissano to 
stand for one more term, and he wanted to stand again in 2004, but Frelimo rejected his 
candidacy and instead chose Armando Guebuza. But the die was cast - corruption was 
endemic. Wages were already being increased; the minimum wage went from $24 per 
month in 1996 to $53 in 2005 and $95 in 2015. Nurses and teachers now earn a living 
wage. But corruption has become normalised - teachers and the traffic police still expect 
extra payments. 
 
Secrecy 
This, in turn, created a new climate of secrecy, and deals done behind closed doors - 
both with foreign investors and for local privatisations. Ambassadors began to lobby for 
special treatment for companies from their countries, which sometimes involved key 
people in the right ministries receiving trips to conferences or other kinds of visits. With 
this came a parade of business people wanting land and promoting investment, and 
usually offering shares in the company to key Mozambicans to facilitate the investment. 
They always said the deal required 'commercial secrecy' so that others did not steal their 
money-making idea. But many were implausible. The Procana sugar and ethanol project 
in Gaza claimed it would produce four times as much ethanol as any similar project in 
Mozambique, and it collapsed in 2008. The 2009 prospectus for investors in the Hoyo 
Hoyo soya plantation in Zambézia promised a 41% rate of return and to be making a 
profit within two years. Legal action was taken against me to try to stop me publishing 
the 41% and keep it secret; such returns were impossible and the project collapsed.38 
In 2001 it was revealed that Mozambique was a major drugs transit centre, 
mainly for heroin but also hashish and mandrax. Heroin was imported from Pakistan 
and sent on to South Africa and Europe. The trade was carried out by Asian-origin 
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business people, but regulated by the Frelimo leadership; the party and its leaders 
profited by tens of millions of dollars per year.39 Donors decided to ignore the 
revelations for two reasons. First, the informal licensing system was so effective that 
there were no wars between drug gangs. Second, Mozambique was seen as a star of 
neoliberal reform and they did not want this image besmirched. So nothing was said. 
US officials in Washington in 2010 unexpectedly named Mohamed Bachir Suleman 
(MBS), as a 'significant foreign narcotics trafficker or "drug kingpin",' which made it 
illegal for 'US persons' or anyone dealing with the US financial system to have any 
business dealings with MBS or any of his businesses, including his Maputo Shopping 
Centre where 'all establishments within are "off-limits".'40 MBS was known as an ally 
and funder of Frelimo. Donors in Maputo paid no attention; MBS and drugs were never 
again mentioned. Before long, trade at the Maputo shopping centre returned to normal. 
And the regulated drug trade continues.41 
Not all secrecy promoted corruption and fraud. One group in Mozambique saw a 
space and used the new culture of secrecy to promote domestic development.  I noted 
earlier that foreign investors could be protected but not domestic ones. Another of the 
'necessary conditions' of the World Bank 7 November 1995 Country Assistance 
Strategy42 required the effective shutting down of the cashew nut processing industry, 
putting 10,000 people, mainly women, out of work.43 Cashew kernels were traditionally 
Mozambique's largest agricultural export. It is entirely a peasant crop; each kernel is 
inside a hard shell and processing the nuts was done in large, domestically-owned 
factories. Local industry was protected by a rule that it had to be supplied first before 
unprocessed nuts could be exported, and this was not allowed, because the World Bank 
thought peasants would earn more if Mozambique were forced to export unprocessed 
nuts to India. The Bank's much touted free market experiment failed; the market 
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collapsed and traders captured any extra profits, so peasants lost out badly. In secret, 
from 2001 the government adopted an explicitly interventionist strategy supporting the 
development of new factories and agreeing with cashew traders that they only be 
allowed to export raw cashew after local factory demand was satisfied - explicitly 
against the World Bank 1995 policy - and providing peasants with tree seedlings, 
spraying and technical assistance. By 2006 it was a public success, but for five years it 
was kept extremely low key so that donors and lenders did not have to admit it was 
happening.44 
 
The '7 million' 
Another secret development project proved to be more complex and controversial. The 
failure of the free market to promote rural recovery and development in the decade after 
the war was becoming more obvious. After his nomination as party leader and 
presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza in 2003 and 2004 travelled extensively 
through rural areas and highlighted the lack of rural credit as a major barrier to 
development. The IMF opposed development banks as 'directed lending to priority 
sectors' which interfered with the free market, and in 2003 the World Bank included 
'credit not directed' as one of its indicators of 'good governance'. Nonetheless, during the 
2004 election campaign Guebuza called for the creation of a development bank; donors 
brazenly intervened in the campaign with a public declaration that they would oppose a 
development bank.45  
The new government's response was to sneak a single line into the 2006 budget 
for a district development fund, with 7 million Meticais ($280,000) for each of 144 
districts (and thereafter always called the '7 million' by the public, even though it was 
subsequently increased).46 Donors and the World Bank were appalled and shocked that 
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they had not noticed this in the budget. But the Finance and Planning ministries had 
been extremely careful. They realised that any discussion about how the money was to 
be used would be noticed by donor representatives in the ministries, so there was no 
prior discussion - simply the insertion of a single budget line. Most people in 
government agreed that a proper development bank would have been better, because it 
could have been properly organised with support which had been offered by the highly 
successful Brazilian and South African development banks. But as that was not allowed, 
the '7 million' was the next best thing. Rules had to be created after the fact and there 
was corruption and patronage, but the 7 million has been successful in putting 
substantial amounts of money into the rural economy and helping to create at least some 
rural businesses and jobs. 
Another secret development deal involved the first major coal mine in 
Mozambique. Toward the end of his term, President Joaquim Chissano personally 
negotiated for the giant Brazilian Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (now just Vale) to open 
a mine in Moatize, Tete. The contract was signed in June 2007, and involved $120 
million for the government for a special development fund deposited in a New York 
bank account.47 The justification was that IMF spending caps still restricted 
development spending, so the money needed to be kept off the budget. Enough donors 
agreed, so the government was allowed to keep its $120 mn slush fund. 
Thus over two decades a climate was created in which good was done in stealth. 
Development actions such as the cashew industry, the 7 million and donor funding of 
health and development workers could only be accomplished if they were kept below 
the radar. Donors and lenders had huge power, and if they would not allow discussion, 
as of the development bank, then even good people in government felt they had to act in 
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secret. Sometimes it was sufficient to just keep actions low key, as with cashew, so 
donors and lenders were able to hide their eyes. 
There are two problems with the climate of secrecy. The first is that broader 
discussion often leads to better results. Although cashew was well handled, in part 
because many people were involved, the '7 million' could have been much better 
organized with more and broader discussion. Second, under the table transactions are 
always open to unofficial commissions and diversion of money, and other kinds of 
promises such as jobs or contracts. When the lenders and donors force a shroud of 
secrecy, they create space for the increasing number of Mozambicans who demand a 
share. 
 
The gas bonanza 
'Privatization means privatizing for the foreigner, and the domestic entrepreneurs do not 
have the resources, they are not given the chance to have the resources, and they are not 
part of … creating wealth in the country and providing jobs,' complained President 
Armando Guebuza in a speech at the Carter Centre in the US on 9 December 2005.48 
This speech reflected the growing anger that the neoliberal policies of the donors and 
lenders were biased toward foreign investment, and that the creation of a domestic 
capitalist class was being held back. This partly reflected a younger and better educated 
group who wanted to develop serious businesses, and who rejected the rent-seeking 
approach of the Chissano era.49 Also the success with cashew and the 7 million, plus the 
growth of domestic businesses productively using government links, led to a view that 
the state was important in the economy. This was underlined in 2012 by the oppening of 
the third mobile telephone network by Movitel, jointly owned by Frelimo and the 
Vietnamese military. It quickly became the best and most successful mobile company, 
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providing coverage in rural areas with large number of poorer people, instead of the two 
earlier companies that had concentrated on urban areas. It seemed proof that party and 
military companies could be both profitable and promote development.  
Guebuza's second term as president (2010-14) saw Mozambique's totally 
unexpected transformation to a major natural resource economy, with the opening of 
two major coals mines in 2011 and the discovery of one of the largest reserves of 
natural gas in Africa in 2010. Instead of investments in the tens of millions of dollars, 
these would involve billions of dollars. And the new business people responded in 
classic comprador fashion, creating companies to serve the new mineral-energy 
investors - often using party or state leverage to force their services to be chosen. The 
cities of Maputo, Tete, Nampula and Pemba began to boom, with construction fuelled 
by expectations and various sorts of illegal money. 
Gas appeared to promise untold wealth to Mozambique - and to well placed 
Mozambicans. And the Guebuza presidency came at a time of global change and the 
growth of a global super-rich, the 1%. The Frelimo elite saw it as their right to be part 
of this 1%. 
The Frelimo elite in Guebuza's second term had a view of domestic capitalism 
and international relations shaped by four attitudes: 1) Comprador: advancement in 
business is based on serving foreign interests - corporate, donor or lender; 2) Secrecy: 
deals and development are done in secret, without public discussion; 3) Self-interest: 
getting rich will help the poor and it is reasonable to want a share of the spoils; and 4) 
Gas: loans will be paid off by the gas money. 
This seemed the road which had been mapped out over 35 years by the 
'international community': lenders, donors, ambassadors and international business 
people. 
Hanlon - Following donor-designed path to Mozambique's $2.2 billion secret debt deal - 3WQ  - author original 
 
24 
 
The secret loans 
Thus it may not have seemed strange in 2011-13 when President Guebuza was 
presented with a secret proposal to create a tuna fishing fleet, a maritime security 
company, and a ship repair and maintenance company. Illegal and unregulated fishing is 
a major problem around Africa, especially in Mozambique,50 so a national tuna 
company could be profitable and exploit local resources. Similarly Mozambique could 
establish sovereignty over its own territorial waters, and could provide security for the 
offshore gas industry.  
Three new state companies were created, largely owned by the security services 
SISE (State Security and Intelligence Service, Serviço de Informação e Segurança do 
Estado)51: 
• Ematum (Mozambique Tuna Company, $850 mn loan) for a tuna fleet and 
maritime security, owned 33% by IGEPE (state holding company), 33% by 
Emopesca (state fishing company), and 33% by SISE; 
• Proindicus ($622 mn) to provide maritime security, particularly for offshore oil 
and gas operations, owned 50% by Monte Binga (Ministry of Defence and 
central government company) and 50% by SISE; and  
• Mozambique Asset Management (MAM, $535 mn), set up for maritime repair 
and maintenance, 98% owned by SISE and 1% each by Ematum and Proindicus. 
The three companies and projects are linked. CEO of all three companies is 
SISE director António Carlos do Rosário. Privinvest is the main contractor in the 
Mozambique maritime contracts. It is owned by French-Lebanese businessmen 
brothers, Akram and Iskandar Safa, and is based in Beirut and Abu Dhabi, and also 
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owns the CMN (Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie, Mechanical Constructions of 
Normandy) shipyard in France which built the fishing boats. 
The proposals for the three companies said they would repay the loans and earn 
large profits from fishing, ship repair, selling security services to oil and gas drilling 
rigs, and by charging fishing boats and cargo ships passing through the Mozambique 
channel. 
The package may have seemed reasonable at the time. The project would be 
secret, both on commercial grounds, but also to not let donors and lenders know that 
three state companies were being set up. As with cashew a decade earlier, the 
government could only promote a good development programme if the more rigid 
donors and lenders did not see. And in 2013 the prices of oil and gas were very high, so 
a government guarantee for the loans seemed a safe idea. 
Initially the project seemed to have international approval. The loans were 
organised by major banks, Credit Suisse and VTB, which is 61% owned by the Russian 
government, and the banks actually encouraged Mozambique to increase the size of the 
loans. Furthermore, Mozambique seemed to have diplomatic support. There was a 
public ceremony to launch the boat construction at the CMN shipyard in Cherbourg, 
France, with Guebuza, France's President Francois Hollande and CMN owner Iskandar 
Safa.52 Finally, the loans to the three companies were linked to substantial purchases of 
boats, planes, communications equipment and other hardware from France, Germany, 
Portugal, Turkey, China, India, Israel, Sweden, Austria, Romania and the United 
States.53 
And when the tuna fishing boat loan became public in 2013, the IMF only asked 
that the loan be put into the state budget - which must have again suggested that the 
other loans would also be acceptable to the IMF.54 
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Only in early 2016 was it revealed that it was not just the Ematum loan. There 
were two others plus secret suppliers' credits for $221 mn taken by the Ministry of 
Interior between 2009 and 2014, which included armoured cars prominently displayed 
in response to riot threats in Maputo in April 2016. Thus, in secret and without telling 
the IMF, donors or bondholders, the government had guaranteed $2,228 million in debt. 
State loan guarantees require parliamentary approval, which had not been requested. 
And by this time oil and gas prices had collapsed and the gas projects in Mozambique 
were delayed. In April 2016, the IMF stopped disbursement on a loan under the Standby 
Credit Facility and the budget support donors all stopped payments directly to the 
government budget (but continued to fund projects).55 
It appears that the three loans had been negotiated by Armando Guebuza, when 
he was president, and a very small group around him. When Filipe Nyusi's new 
government took office in January 2015, they did not know the details and magnitude of 
the loans, although they knew they had a problem. Adriano Maleiane, who is highly 
respected and who two decades earlier had fought with the World Bank and IMF to try 
to prevent corrupt bank privatizations, was named finance minister in 2015 to try to 
clean up the mess and deal with lenders and donors. 
The initial offense, as it had been a decade earlier with the '7 million' district 
development funds, was that it had been kept secret from donors and the IMF. But the '7 
million' had at least been a been a single budget line; this was much more serious 
because it had not been included in the state budget and the guarantees had not been 
approved by parliament. In mid-2016, when details of the three projects had still not 
been made public, available information suggested that the loans became an umbrella 
for substantial military equipment purchases. And there were accusations that prices, for 
example of the fishing boats, were inflated to allow commissions for various parties to 
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the agreement.56 IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde told the BBC on 18 May 
2016 that in keeping the loans secret, the Mozambique government is "clearly 
concealing corruption."57  
The argument could be made that just as the '7 million' had to be introduced 
without proper discussion and regulation so that the donors and lenders did not block it, 
so tuna and maritime security had to be done the same way. But with the boats, the 
secrecy had a much higher price. The basic ideas of tuna fishing and maritime industries 
are probably sensible, but Mozambique has no crews capable of running the fishing 
boats or the sophisticated patrol boats, and there had apparently been no discussion with 
the gas companies as to whether they would accept a purely Mozambican security 
company (which seems highly unlikely). Public discussions and open tenders might 
have led to longer term joint ventures with appropriate training and the potential for 
contracts with the gas companies. More open discussions would have allowed experts to 
check profit predictions, the appropriateness of the boats, and the prices being offered. 
 
Conclusion: following the road map 
Taking $2.2 billion in secret loans to create security service owned fishing and maritime 
companies seems a flagrant violation of both 'good governance' and good sense. 
However, the loans and projects follow the road for the creation of domestic capitalism 
shaped by donors and lenders during more than four decades of change management. In 
moving the Mozambican elite away from socialism, lenders and donors promoted a 
particular model in which domestic business was based on patronage, government and 
donor largesse, and rent-seeking. Businesspeople and members of the elite were 
expected to service foreign interests. The split between the lender and donor rhetoric of 
market fundamentalism and the need to intervene to create a domestic business class 
Hanlon - Following donor-designed path to Mozambique's $2.2 billion secret debt deal - 3WQ  - author original 
 
28 
was recognised, and thus government and the elites were given space both to promote 
development and promote their own interests so long as it was done in secret and did 
not challenge the rhetoric. And with the potential of billions of dollars from gas to be 
shared between foreign and domestic interests, local elites were encouraged to dream of 
super riches. The $2.2 billion in loans fit within this pattern - and had it not been for the 
unexpected drop in oil and gas prices, lenders and donors probably would have allowed 
it to pass with little comment and a small slap on the wrist. 
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